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BALANCING THE NEED FOR ENERGY AND 
CLEAN WATER: THE CASE FOR APPLYING 
STRICT LIABILITY IN HYDRAULIC 
FRACTURING SUITS 
Hannah Coman* 
Abstract: Hydraulic facturing is a process used to extract natural gas from 
shale formations. This process has been used commercially since the 
1940s, but has recently become prevalent as more shale formations have 
been discovered, specifically the Marcellus Shale formation in Pennsyl-
vania. Although natural gas is a relatively clean source of domestic energy, 
there have been numerous allegations of water contamination caused by 
hydraulic fracturing, and several lawsuits have been filed as a result. Two of 
these suits (Berish v. Southwestern Energy Production Co. and Fiorentino v. Cabot 
& Gas) are pending in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania. Both complaints seek recovery under a strict liability cause 
of action—asserting that hydraulic fracturing is an “ultrahazardous and 
abnormally dangerous” activity. Although it is unlikely that the court will 
adopt a strict liability framework in deciding these cases, this Note argues 
that such a framework is both legally appropriate and beneficial to helping 
balance our energy needs and the importance of clean water. These pend-
ing cases will likely set the standard for future hydraulic fracturing con-
tamination cases in Pennsylvania, and potentially across the United States. 
Introduction 
 The ability to ignite running tap water is just one of the signs that 
hydraulic fracturing may have contaminated the water.1 Hydraulic frac-
turing is a process during which a fracturing fluid is pumped into the 
ground to extract natural gas from previously inaccessible deposits.2 
                                                                                                                      
* Senior Articles Editor, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 
2011–12. 
1 See Christopher Swann, Shale Gas Needs to Allay Environmental Doubts, N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 
2011, at B2; Mike Soraghan, Natural Gas: Groundtruthing ‘Gasland, Energy and Env’t Daily 
(Feb. 24, 2011), http://www.eenews.net/public/Greenwire/2011/02/24/2?page_type=print. 
2 See Chesapeake Energy, Hydraulic Fracturing: Fact Sheet 1 (2011), available at 
http://www.chk.com/Media/Educational-Library/Fact-Sheets/Corporate/Hydraulic_Frac- 
turing_Fact_Sheet.pdf; EPA, Science in Action: Hydraulic Fracturing Research Study 
1 (2010), available at http://www.epa.gov/safewater/uic/pdfs/hfresearchstudyfs.pdf. 
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The recent increase in demand for natural gas coupled with technical 
advances in drilling have dramatically increased the number of hydrau-
lic fracturing projects, especially in Pennsylvania.3 Natural gas has be-
come extremely attractive as an energy source mainly due to the volatil-
ity of energy prices4 and the need for domestic, relatively clean energy 
sources.5 In the United States, conventional gas deposits still produce 
large quantities of fuel but are in decline.6 Hydraulic fracturing pro-
vides access to unconventional deposits, thereby geographically ex-
panding the “gaslands” and unlocking, in some regions, a “Saudi Ara-
bia of Natural Gas.”7 As T. Boone Pickens recently said, in comparison 
to oil, natural gas is “cleaner, cheaper . . . abundant, and ours.”8 This 
expansion is likely to continue—it is predicted that by 2020, twenty 
percent of our natural gas will come from hydraulic fracturing.9 While 
some trumpet natural gas as America’s “New Energy Frontier,”10 others 
have questioned the wisdom of the break-neck pace of expansion, es-
                                                                                                                      
3 See J. Daniel Arthur et al., Hydraulic Fracturing Considerations for Natu-
ral Gas Wells of the Marcellus Shale 1 (2008), available at http://www.dec.ny.gov/ 
docs/materials_minerals_pdf/GWPCMarcellus.pdf; Christopher Bateman, A Colossal Fracking 
Mess, Vanity Fair ( June 21, 2010), http://www.vanityfair.com/business/features/2010/06/ 
fracking-in-pennsylvania-201006. 
4 See U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Dept. of Energy, Energy Price Impacts on the 
U.S. Economy 6 (2001), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/economy/energy_price. 
pdf; Hannah Wiseman, Regulatory Adaptation in Fractured Appalachia, 21 Vill. Envtl. L.J. 
229, 229–30 (2010). 
5 See Wiseman, supra note 4, at 231; see also Ralph E.H. Sims et al., Energy Supply, in 
Climate Change 2007: Mitigation, at 265 (2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/ 
assessment-report/ar4/wg3/ar4-wg3-chapter4.pdf (stating that “[n]atural gas is the fossil 
fuel that produces the lowest amount of greenhouse gas per unit of energy consumed and 
is therefore favoured (sic) in mitigation strategies”). 
6 See Wiseman, supra note 4, at 233. Natural gas from conventional deposits peaked in 
the 1970s. Id. 
7 See EPA, supra note 2, at 1; Chad Pergram, Pennsylvania District Turns into ‘Saudi Arabia of 
Natural Gas’ Ahead of Tuesday Primary, Fox News.com (May 17, 2010), http://www.foxnews. 
com/politics/2010/05/17/pennsylvania-district-turns-saudi-arabia-natural-gas-ahead- tues-
day-primary/; Unconventional Natural Gas Resources, NaturalGas.org, http://www.natural 
gas.org/overview/unconvent_ng_resource.asp (last visited Jan. 19, 2012). 
8 Abrahm Lustgarten, Buried Secrets: Is Natural Gas Drilling Endangering U.S. Water Sup-
plies?, Pro Publica (Nov. 13, 2008, 1:00 PM), http://www.propublica.org/article/buried-
secrets-is-natural-gas-drilling-endangering-us-water-supplies-1113. In fact, burning gas, used 
primarily to heat homes and make electricity, emits twenty-three percent less carbon diox-
ide than burning oil. Id. Furthermore, gas is the country’s second-largest domestic energy 
resource after coal. Id. 
9 EPA, supra note 2, at 1. This trend is also apparent worldwide— “[d]espite rising 
prices, natural gas is forecast to continue to be the fastest-growing primary fossil fuel en-
ergy source worldwide.” Sims et al., supra note 5, at 266. 
10 Natural Gas, Am. Petrol. Inst. (Nov. 24, 2010), http://www.api.org/aboutoilgas/ 
natgas/. 
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pecially since the environmental and health risks of hydraulic fractur-
ing are dire at worst, and unknown at best.11 
 One of the main environmental and health concerns related to 
hydraulic fracturing is clean water. Both water and energy are necessary 
in large quantities for the United States to continue to function and 
thrive. A justice on the Texas Supreme Court recently wrote that while 
water, not oil, is the lifeblood of Texas, “oil and gas are its muscle.”12 
The same could be said of the United States as a whole. Unfortunately, 
the United States will have to make some difficult and serious decisions 
about the nation’s water and energy supplies, especially in regards to 
hydraulic fracturing.13 
 Currently, there are two pending hydraulic fracturing cases before 
the U.S. District Court for the Middle District Court of Pennsylvania 
(Berish v. Southwestern Energy Production Co. and Fiorentino v. Cabot & Gas) 
involving strict liability causes of action that implicate state law.14 This 
Note discusses the possible success and impact of these two claims on 
the future of hydraulic fracturing. The outcome in these cases will af-
fect the future of hydraulic fracturing in Pennsylvania, and could have 
implications for hydraulic fracturing across the United States. Part I 
introduces hydraulic fracturing and its environmental concerns, cur-
rent federal and state regulation of the process, and the pending law-
suits in Pennsylvania. Part II examines the historical foundations and 
rationale of strict liability. Part III analyzes the current status of the 
strict liability doctrine and pertinent case law. Finally, Part IV examines 
the likelihood of successfully applying a strict liability framework to the 
two pending hydraulic fracturing cases in Pennsylvania. The Note con-
cludes that strict liability is both legally appropriate and socially benefi-
                                                                                                                      
11 See Katie Howell, More Oversight Sought for Hydraulic Fracturing, N.Y. Times (Nov. 4, 
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2009/11/04/04greenwire-more-oversight-sought-
for-hydraulic-fracturing-35961.html; ‘Fracking’ for Energy in Northeast: Boon or Doom?, Envi-
ronment on MSNBC (Nov. 11, 2010), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/40135664/ns/us_ 
news-environment [hereinafter Fracking Boon or Doom]. 
12 Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 26 (Tex. 2008) (Wil-
lett, J., concurring). 
13 See Lee Dye, ‘New’ Energy Sources Hard on Water Supply, ABC News.com (Apr. 23, 2008), 
http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/story?id=4703865&page=1; Paul O’Callaghan, Energy 
Versus Water: Is Blue the New Green?, Clean Technica.com (Nov. 10, 2008), http://cleantech- 
nica.com/2008/11/10/energy-versus-water-is-blue-the-new-green/. 
14 See Complaint for Petitioner, Berish et al. v. Sw. Energy Prod. Co., No. 210-1882CP, 
2010 WL 4230599 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 14, 2010), available at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/ 
images/blogs/greeninc/complaint.pdf [hereinafter Berish Complaint]; Amended Com-
plaint, Fiorentino v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., No. 3:09-cv-02284-TIV, 2010 WL 931974 (M.D. 
Pa. Mar. 5, 2010) [hereinafter Fiorentino Complaint]. 
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cial, although it is highly unlikely that the court will apply this form of 
liability in these cases. 
I. Hydraulic Fracturing: Dividing Rocks, Politics, and 
Communities in Pennsylvania 
A. What Is Hydraulic Fracturing? 
 Hydraulic fracturing, often referred to as “fracing,”15 is a process 
which uses water to stimulate and extract natural gas from geologic 
formations with low permeability.16 Hydraulic fracturing wells are 
drilled in three ways—vertically, vertically and horizontally, or direc-
tionally—and can range from slightly less than 1000 feet to greater than 
8000 feet deep.17 Once the well is drilled, the drillers pump water, sand, 
and additives into the wellbore at extremely high pressures.18 This pres-
sure causes the fracturingof the surrounding rock and the injection of 
sand or other “propping agents”19 into the rock fractures, which hold 
them open.20 Once the pressure on the fracturing fluid (water and 
chemical additives) is reduced, all of the fluid is supposed to return to 
the surface for disposal or re-use, and the natural gas flows from the 
fractures in the rock into the wellbore for subsequent extraction.21 
 Ultimately, hydraulic fracturing is a process that removes natural 
gas from unconventional deposits—those that present increased tech-
nical challenges and require additional expense to extract natural 
gas.22 These unconventional natural gas resources include geologic 
formations such as shale and coalbeds.23 Fracing has been used com-
                                                                                                                      
15 “Fracing” is pronounced and sometimes spelled “fracking.” Wiseman, supra note 4, 
at 233 n.22. 
16 See Arthur, supra note 3, at 1; EPA, supra note 2, at 1. 
17 EPA, supra note 2, at 1. 
18 Hydraulic Fracturing Facts: The Process, Chesapeake Energy, http://www.hydraulic 
fracturing.com/Process/Pages/information.aspx (last visited Jan. 19, 2012). 
19 These “propping agents,” also referred to as “proppants,” are “ultra-hard sand grains 
and tiny manmade ceramic balls.” James MacPherson, Tiny Particles Used by Oil Drillers in Big 
Demand, R&D Mag. (Jan. 10, 2011), http://www.rdmag.com/News/2011/01/Tiny-particles-
used-by-oil-drillers-in-big-demand/Energy-Tiny-particles-used-by-oil-drillers-in-big-demand/. 
20 EPA, supra note 2, at 1; Hydraulic Fracturing Facts: The Process, supra note 18. 
21 See EPA, supra note 2, at 1–2. 
22 Unconventional Natural Gas Resources, supra note 7. The definition of unconventional 
natural gas resources evolves over time, but it generally includes: “deep gas, tight gas, gas-
containing shales, coalbed methane, geopressurized zones, and Arctic and sub-sea hy-
drates.” Id. 
23 See id. 
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mercially in the United States for this purpose since the 1940s,24 but 
has recently increased due to technological advances and demand.25 In 
fact, unconventional gas deposits comprise an increasingly large per-
centage of our nation’s natural gas supply.26 
                                                                                                                     
B. Environmental Concerns 
 Despite the fact that hydraulic fracturing has become an integral 
part of our nation’s energy profile,27 fracing comes with grave envi-
ronmental concerns. Although many people are troubled by the 
amount of water used in the process, the procedure for dealing with 
waste water,28 and the adverse impact on air quality,29 this Note will fo-
cus solely on whether gas companies should be held strictly liable for 
contaminated drinking water due to hydraulic fracturing. There are 
numerous complaints from people living near hydraulic fracturing 
wells alleging that their well water has been contaminated by this proc-
ess.30 As a result, many people are concerned about the possible con-
tamination of drinking water from fracturing fluid and “degradation 
products and naturally occurring materials in the geologic formation 
(e.g. metals, radionuclides) that are mobilized and brought to the sur-
face during the hydraulic fracturing process.”31 
 
24 Chesapeake Energy, supra note 2, at 1. 
25 See Arthur, supra note 3, at 1. 
26 Anthony Andrews et al., Cong. Research Serv., Unconventional Gas Shales: 
Development, Technology, and Policy Issues 3 (2009), available at http://www.fas.org/ 
sgp/crs/misc/R40894.pdf; Facts About Shale Gas, Am. Petrol. Inst. (Feb. 1, 2010), http:// 
www.api.org/policy/exploration/hydraulicfracturing/shale_gas.cfm. It is predicted that 
unconventional gas production will “increase from 42 percent of total U.S. gas production 
in 2007 to 64 percent in 2020.” Andrews et al., supra, at 3. 
27 See Am. Petrol. Inst., Freeing Up Energy, Hydraulic Fracturing: Unlocking 
America’s Natural Gas Resources 2 (2010). “Hydraulic fracturing is so important that 
without it, we would lose 45 percent of domestic natural gas production and 17 percent of 
our oil production within five years.” Id. 
28 See Edith Honan, Water Waste a Kink in New York Shale Gas Future, Reuters (Feb. 19, 
2010, 1:36 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN1918902220100219?pageNumber=1. 
“The volume of water needed for hydraulic fracturing varies by site and type formation.” 
EPA, supra note 2, at 2. For example, a coalbed well may require 50,000 to 350,000 gallons of 
water, while one horizontal well in a shale formation may need 2 million to 5 million gallons 
of water for the fracturing process. Id. 
29 Joel Kirkland, Natural Gas: Fears of Pervasive Air Pollution Stir Up Politics in Texas Shale Gas 
Country, Env’t & Energy Daily (Aug. 2, 2010), http://www.eenews.net/public/climate 
wire/2010/08/02/1. 
30 See Amy Mall, Incidents Where Hydraulic Fracturing Is a Suspected Cause of Drinking Water 
Contamination, Switchboard: Natural Res. Def. Council Staff Blog (Mar. 7, 2011), 
http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/amall/incidents_where_hydraulic_frac.html. 
31 EPA, supra note 2, at 2. 
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 Hydraulic fracturing fluid is approximately ninety percent water, 
nine percent sand, and roughly one percent chemical additives.32 The 
precise makeup of these chemical additives is unknown because many 
companies consider the ingredients to be trade secrets.33 Nevertheless, 
a few of the chemicals commonly found in fracturing fluid are hydro-
chloric acid, ethylene glycol, ammonium persulfate, citric acid, potas-
sium chloride, potassium carbonate, and isopropanol.34 There have 
even been reports that some fracing fluids may also contain diesel 
fuel,35 benzene, and arsenic.36 Despite the fact that chemical additives 
only comprise roughly one percent of the fracturing fluid, the process 
of using these chemicals is alarming because of the total amount of 
fracturing fluid used in the extraction process.37 
 The hydraulic fracturing process uses an incredible amount of 
fracturing fluid. For example, water usage—which comprises nearly 
ninety percent of fracturing fluid—can range from 50,000 to 5 million 
gallons of water.38 Problematically, not all of the fracturing fluid is re-
covered after the stimulation process; rather, the rest remains in the 
                                                                                                                      
32 See Am. Petrol. Inst., supra note 27, at 8. 
33 See Howell, supra note 11. Despite this, eight of nine major energy companies voluntar-
ily disclosed descriptions of the chemical components they use in fracing. See Matthew Daly, 
EPA: Halliburton Issued Subpoena for Refusing to Disclose Hydraulic Fracturing, ‘Fracking,’ Chemical 
Ingredients, Huffington Post (Nov. 9, 2010, 5:41 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
2010/11/09/epa-halliburton-subpoenae_n_781045.html. The only company to refuse to 
disclose this information was Halliburton, which was subsequently subpoenaed by the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency. See Press Release, EPA, Eight of Nine U.S. Companies Agree to 
Work with EPA Regarding Chemicals Used in Natural Gas Extraction (Nov. 9, 2010), available 
at http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/6427a6b7538955c585257359003f0230/a9649 
6444c546959852577d6005e63d6!OpenDocument. 
34 U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Modern Shale Gas Development in the United States: 
A Primer 63 exhibit 36 (2009), available at http://www.rrc.state.tx.us/doeshale/Shale_ 
Gas_Primer_2009.pdf. 
35 Mike Soraghan, Two Oil-Field Companies Acknowledge Fracking with Diesel, N.Y. Times (Feb. 
19, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/02/19/19greenwire-two-oil-field-companies- 
acknowledge-fracking-w-90863.html. Although the three largest oil-field service companies 
signed a memorandum of agreement with the EPA in 2003 to discontinue hydraulic fracturing 
with diesel near underground water supplies, both Halliburton and BJ Services acknowledged 
in 2008 that they had violated the agreement. Id. 
36 Jonathan Story, Hydraulic Fracturing: Balancing Trade Secrets with the (Potential) Public Inter-
est, Chicago Faculty Blog: The Legal Infrastructure of Business (Oct. 24, 2010, 11:33 
PM), http://picker.typepad.com/legal_infrastructure_of_b/2010/10/hydraulic-fracturing- 
balancing-trade-secrets-with-the-potential-public-interest.html. 
37 See EPA, supra note 2, at 2; Amy Mall, Should the Public Know What Chemicals Are in Hy-
draulic Fracturing Fluid?, Switchboard: Nat. Res. Def. Council Staff Blog (May 25, 2010), 
http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/amall/should_the_public_know_what_ch.html. 
38 See EPA, supra note 2, at 2. 
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ground.39 Depending on the site, the amount recovered ranges from 
fifteen to eighty percent of the total fracturing fluid injected.40 There-
fore, even though the chemical additives only compose roughly one 
percent of the fracturing fluid,41 the use of these chemicals presents 
increased potential for harms to the environment and the public 
health as a result of the volume of fracing fluid used in the process.42 
 In addition to possible contamination due to chemical additives, 
there are reports that hydraulic fracturing can sometimes bring metals 
present in the rock bed to the surface.43 A recent study found that 
when the fracturing fluid is pumped into the underground rock, the 
uranium naturally present in the rock is “solubilized,” meaning it dis-
solves in water.44 As a result, when the fluid “come[s] back to the sur-
face, it could contain uranium contaminants, potentially polluting 
streams and other ecosystems and generating hazardous waste.”45 Al-
though these small amounts of uranium are not a radioactive risk, “it is 
still a toxic, deadly metal.”46 
C. Current Regulation of Hydraulic Fracturing 
 Before engaging in a discussion of the pending contamination 
cases in Pennsylvania, an understanding of the current regulatory and 
the political environment surrounding fracing is necessary. 
1. A Swiss Cheese Approach to Federal Regulation 
 Hydraulic fracturing, while extremely controversial, currently en-
joys several major exemptions from federal environmental regulations.47 
For example, the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) requires the regula-
tion of all underground injections within Underground Injection Con-
trol (UIC) programs—meaning that an applicant must receive a permit 
to conduct underground injection activity.48 Originally, a permit was 
                                                                                                                      
39 See id. 
40 Id. 
41 See Am. Petrol. Inst., supra note 27, at 9; EPA, supra note 2, at 2. 
42 See EPA, supra note 2, at 2. 
43 ‘Fracking’ Mobilizes Uranium in Marcellus Shale, EurekAlert! (Oct. 25, 2010), http:// 
www.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2010–10/uab-mu102510.php. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Wiseman, supra note 4, at 243. 
48 42 U.S.C. § 300h(b)(1)(A) (2006); Legal Envtl. Assistance Found., Inc. v. EPA, 118 
F.3d 1467, 1474 (11th Cir. 1997) (stating that it is “clear that Congress dictated that all 
underground injection be regulated under the UIC programs”). 
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only supposed to be granted if the applicant demonstrated “that the 
underground injection will not endanger drinking water sources.”49 Be-
fore 2005, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) did not consider 
hydraulic fracturing to be an “underground injection,” so it did not re-
quire a permit.50 An Alabama court ruled in 1997, however, that the 
EPA’s interpretation of “underground injection” was incorrect and that 
hydraulic fracturing should fall under the SDWA.51 
 In response to the court’s ruling, the EPA issued a study on hy-
draulic fracturing and its effect on the environment.52 The study did 
not find a causal connection between contamination cases and inject-
ing fracturing fluid into coalbed methane wells.53 As a result, the EPA 
concluded that the environmental effects of hydraulic fracturing did 
not merit further study.54 Nonetheless, the methodology and impartial-
ity of the expert panel that reviewed theEPA’s findings was questioned 
by several people within and outside of the Agency.55 The EPA study 
was limited in scope and only focused on underground injection of flu-
ids and whether that caused contamination of underground sources of 
drinking water.56 Furthermore, the study neglected to investigate the 
effects of fracing in shale formations.57 
 After the study was published, Congress officially exempted hy-
draulic fracturing from EPA regulation in the 2005 Energy Policy Act.58 
                                                                                                                      
49 Legal Envtl. Assistance Found., 118 F.3d at 1474. 
50 See Wiseman, supra note 4, at 243. 
51 Legal Envtl. Assistance Found., 118 F.3d at 1474; Alabama Lawsuit Poses Threat to Hydraulic 
Fracturing Across U.S., Drilling Contractor, Jan./Feb. 2000, at 42, available at http:// 
www.iadc.org/dcpi/dc-janfeb00/j-coalbed.pdf. 
52 See EPA, Evaluation of Impacts to Underground Sources of Drinking Water 
by Hydraulic Fracturing of Coalbed Methane Reservoirs; National Study Final 
Report 1 (2004), available at http://www.epa.gov/ogwdw/uic/pdfs/cbmstudy_attach_uic_ 
final_fact_sheet.pdf. 
53 See id. 
54 See id. 
55 See EPA Findings on Hydraulic Fracturing Deemed “Unsupportable,” Union of Con-
cerned Scientists: Citizens and Scientists for Envtl. Solutions, http://www.ucsusa. 
org/scientific_integrity/abuses_of_science/oil-extraction.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2012) 
[hereinafter Union of Concerned Scientists]; Todd Hartman, “He’s Either Loved or Reviled”: 
EPA Whistle-Blower Stands up to Agency, Rocky Mountain News (May 31, 2005), http://m. 
rockymountainnews.com/news/2005/may/31/hes-either-loved-or-reviled/. 
56 Hannah Wiseman, Untested Waters: The Rise of Hydraulic Fracturing in Oil and Gas Pro-
duction and the Need to Revisit Regulation, 20 Fordham Envtl. L. Rev. 115, 128 (2009). 
57 Id. 
58 See Anne C. Mulkern, Industry Campaign Targets ‘Hydraulic Fracturing’ Bill, N.Y. Times 
(May 7, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2009/05/07/07greenwire-industry-campaign- 
targets-hydraulic-fracturing-10572.html. 
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Known as the “Halliburton Loophole,”59 this Act allowed fracing to 
continue without the same regulation mandated for other types of drill-
ing and mining.60 This change in the SDWA brought a brief pause to 
the legal and political debate over whether the federal government 
should regulate fracing.61 The debate was renewed in 2009 when De-
mocratic members of Congress introduced twin bills—collectively 
called the Fracturing Responsibility and Awareness of Chemicals Act 
(FRAC Act)—that sought to repeal the exemption for hydraulic frac-
turing in the SWDA, but they were never reported out of committee.62 
Recently,  Democratic Senate and House members reintroduced the 
FRAC Act, but it is unlikely the bill will pass given Republican control of 
the House and industry opposition.63 
 The complexity of the debate surrounding hydraulic fracturing is 
evidenced by disagreement among environmentalists.64 Some envi-
ronmentalists are proponents of fracing because natural gas emits less 
greenhouse gas than either oil or coal.65 Many environmentalists also 
believe that natural gas could become the primary source of electricity 
in the U.S. and serve as a bridge from carbon-heavy sources to renew-
able sources while renewable energy sources are being developed.66 
 Given the social and political debate over hydraulic fracturing, the 
U.S. House of Representatives Appropriation Conference Committee, 
                                                                                                                      
59 Energy: The Pros and Cons of Shale Gas Drilling, CBS News (Nov. 14, 2010), http:// 
www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/11/12/60minutes/main7048737.shtml?tag=contentMain;
contentBody. The change to the SDWA is called the “Halliburton Loophole” because Hal-
liburton is a leading fracing company. Id. 
60 See Editorial, The Halliburton Loophole, N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 2009, at A28; Regulation of 
Hydraulic Fracturing by the Office of Water, Envtl. Prot. Agency, http://water.epa.gov/type/ 
groundwater/uic/class2/hydraulicfracturing/wells_hydroreg.cfm#safehyfr (last updated Sept. 
9, 2010). 
61 Wiseman, supra note 56, at 116. 
62 Fracturing Responsibility and Awareness of Chemicals (FRAC) Act, S. 1215, 111th 
Cong. (2009) (as referred to Senate Env’t and Pub. Works Comm.); H.R. 2766, 111th Cong. 
(2009) (as referred to the Subcomm. on Energy and Env’t); see Bill Summary & Status: 111th 
Congress (2009–2010) S. 1215, The Library of Congress: Thomas, http://thomas.loc.gov/ 
cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:S.1215:@@@L (last visited Jan. 18, 2012); Bill Summary & Status: 
111th Congress (2009–2010) H.R.2766, The Library of Congress: Thomas, http://thomas. 
loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:HR02766:@@@X (last visited Jan. 21, 2012). 
63 Mike Soraghan, Natural Gas: House, Senate Dems Reintroduce the ‘FRAC Act,’ Env’t & 
Energy Daily (Mar. 16, 2011), http://www.eenews.net/EEDaily/2011/03/16/6. 
64 See Clifford Krauss & Tom Zeller, Jr., When a Rig Moves In Next Door, N.Y. Times, Nov. 
7, 2010, at BU7; Ian Urbina, Pressure Limits Efforts to Police Drilling For Gas, N.Y. Times, Mar. 
4, 2011, at A1. 
65 Krauss & Zeller, supra note 64. 
66 Id.; Wiseman, supra note 4, at 229. 
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in its 2010 budget reports, found that the topic merited further study.67 
As part of the study, the EPA requested that nine companies voluntarily 
disclose the chemical additives in their fracing fluid.68 Some question 
the validity of this new study, claiming that it has been co-opted by the 
oil and gas industry and that its scope has been overly narrowed.69 
 Statutory loopholes for the fracing process can also be found in 
other environmental statutes. For example, the Emergency Planning 
and Community Right to Know Act does not require oil and gas pro-
ducers to report their annual releases of toxic chemicals.70 Although 
the Clean Water Act (CWA) prohibits oil and gas operators from dis-
charging pollutants into U.S. waters without a permit, “[p]roponents of 
fracking argue that the Clean Water Act doesn’t cover fracking fluid 
because it enters the earth far below the water table, and thus doesn’t 
have a chance to pollute ground water.”71 Other sources contend, how-
ever, that the CWA could potentially apply to ground sources like wells 
and aquifers.72 While there is currently a gap in the federal regulation 
of hydraulic fracturing, many states and towns affected by fracing are 
attempting to regulate the process.73 
2. “It’s the Economy, Stupid”: State and Local Regulation74 
 Pennsylvania is directly affected by hydraulic fracturing because of 
the exponential increase in the amount of fracing at the Marcellus 
Shale.75 Potentially more significant is the fact that Pennsylvania water-
                                                                                                                      
 
67 See Hydraulic Fracturing, Envtl. Prot. Agency, http://water.epa.gov/type/ground 
water/uic/class2/hydraulicfracturing/index.cfm (last updated Mar. 30, 2011) (citing the 
2010 budget reports as giving the EPA the authority to begin studying hydraulic fracturing). 
68 See Press Release, EPA, supra note 33. 
69 Urbina, supra note 64. 
70 See Wiseman, supra note 4, at 243. 
71 Id. at 262; Shelley DuBois, Does the EPA Have the Tools to Regulate Fracking?, Fortune: 
CNN Money.com (Oct. 1, 2010, 2:52 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2010/10/01/news/ 
companies/ EPA_Clean_Water_Act_fracking.fortune/index.htm. 
72 Tina Casey, It’s About Fracking Time! U.S. EPA Lights a Fire Under Hydraulic Fracturing, 
Clean Technica.com (Mar. 20, 2010), http://cleantechnica.com/2010/03/20/its-about-
fracking-time-u-s-epa-lights-a-fire-under-hydraulic-fracturing/. 
73 See Wes Deweese, Fracturing Misconceptions: A History of Effective State Regulation, Ground-
water Protection, and the Ill-Conceived FRAC Act, 6 Okla. J.L. & Tech. 49, *22–32 (2010), 
http://www.okjolt.org/images/pdf/2010okjoltrev49.pdf. 
74 The phrase “it’s the economy stupid” was coined by James Carville, President Clin-
ton’s campaign strategist for the 1992 presidential election. James Carville, N.Y. Times, 
http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/timestopics/people/c/james_carville/index.
html (last visited Jan. 24, 2012). 
75 See Mark Fischetti, The Drillers Are Coming: Debate over Hydraulic Fracturing Heats Up, 
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sheds supply more than 15 million people—mainly in Philadelphia and 
New York City—with water.76 As a result, the threat of water contamina-
tion does not only affect specific plaintiffs, but also the future of the wa-
ter quality in Pennsylvania and New York generally.77 There is much de-
bate and little progress on the Pennsylvania state and local government 
levels as to whether fracing regulations should be passed.78 For example, 
the Pittsburgh City Council voted unanimously to forbid natural gas 
drilling due to health and environmental concerns.79 A continuous ef-
fort to pass legislation to regulate fracing at the state level, however, has 
been curtailed by political and economic considerations.80 
 Although the debate surrounding hydraulic fracturing is about 
energy and the environment, sometimes politics and the economy play 
a more substantial role. For example, newly elected Republican Gover-
nor Tom Corbett is viewed as a supporter of the gas industry in Penn-
sylvania.81 He has pledged to end outgoing Democratic Governor Ed 
Rendell’s executive order prohibiting the issuing of more drilling leases 
in state forests.82 Additionally, in May 2010, a study financed by the gas 
industry estimated that gas companies spent $4.5 billion developing 
shale deposits in Pennsylvania.83 In return, this investment generated 
$389 million in state and local tax revenue and more than 44,000 
jobs.84 The increase in economic activity is predominantly in the truck-
ing and short-line railroad industries, as well as quarries and steel-pipe 
making companies.85 
 Simultaneously, however, environmental concerns among Pennsyl-
vania residents have intensified so much that some hydraulic fracturing 
companies have begun using armed and uniformed escorts when meet-
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77 See id. 
78 See Fracking Boon or Doom, supra note 11. 
79 Pittsburgh Bans Natural Gas Drilling, CBS News.com (Nov. 16, 2010), http://www.cbs 
news.com/stories/2010/11/16/national/main7060953.shtml. 
80 See Fracking Boon or Doom, supra note 11. 
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ing with residents.86 Due to the politically and economically charged 
nature of this issue,87 potential plaintiffs in hydraulic fracturing cases 
are not waiting for new legislation or regulation. Instead, many are rely-
ing on the common law to address their concerns.88 
D. Residents Say, “Get the Frac Out of Here!” 
 Many residents who live close to hydraulic fracturing sites are wor-
ried about water contamination.89 In fact, courts and state and local 
governments in Colorado, New Mexico, Alabama, Ohio, and Pennsyl-
vania have documented more than 1,000 cases of contamination from 
hydraulic fracturing.90 
 Two lawsuits have recently been filed by Pennsylvania residents 
from Susquehanna County against companies participating in hydrau-
lic fracturing for allegedly contaminating their well water.91 Susque-
hanna County has a population of 40,000 people and has been tradi-
tionally one of Pennsylvania’s poorest counties.92 Historically, the 
primary industries in Susquehanna were agriculture, blue stone quarry-
ing, and light manufacturing.93 This changed with the discovery of the 
Marcellus Shale Formation.94 The first hydraulic fracturing well was 
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drilled in Susquehanna in 2006, and by 2011 there were nearly 200 
wells in the county with many more well-drilling permits pending.95 
The alleged environmental consequence from this development has 
caused much discontent among residents.96 
 The plaintiffs in Berish alleged that due to releases, spills, and dis-
charges from hydraulic fracturing they were exposed to “hazardous 
gases, chemicals, and industrial wastes” which caused “[p]laintiffs to 
incur health injuries, loss of use and enjoyment of their property, loss 
of quality of life, emotional distress, and other damages.”97 Similarly, 
plaintiffs in Fiorentino alleged that they were exposed to “combustible 
gases, hazardous chemicals, threats of explosions and fires” and as a 
result, they are “in a constant state of severe emotional distress consis-
tent with post traumatic stress syndrome.”98 Both complaints seek re-
covery under a strict liability cause of action—asserting that hydraulic 
fracturing is an “ultra hazardous and abnormally dangerous” activity.99 
 One important factor the court will consider in both cases is the 
location of the hydraulic fracturing wells in relation to the plaintiffs’ 
residences and water supplies.100 In Berish, the plaintiffs are from two 
small towns approximately ten miles apart, and about thirty minutes 
from Scranton, Pennsylvania.101 The current population of Kingsley is 
fifty people, but the population around the outskirts of the town is ap-
proximately 200.102 The locations of the fracing wells are within 700 to 
1700 feet from plaintiffs’ properties, homes, and water supplies.103 In 
Fiorentino, the sixty-three plaintiffs reside or resided in two different 
small towns.104 One of the towns is about an hour northwest of Scran-
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ton, Pennsylvania.105 These plaintiffs’ residences and water supplies are 
approximately 400–1300 feet from the fracing well.106 
 In response to such suits, the gas industry often defends the hy-
draulic fracturing process by either claiming that the process is com-
pletely safe and that it did not cause the contamination, or that as long 
as there is proper well construction the groundwater in the area is pro-
tected from the chemicals used in the fracing fluid.107 Additionally, 
drilling companies also often argue that existing state regulation is suf-
ficient.108 In Fiorentino, the defendant gas company claimed that since 
“drilling is similar to the operation of underground pipelines or storage 
tanks” it is therefore not an “abnormally dangerous” activity.109 The 
court applied Pennsylvania state law and ruled that the issue of whether 
hydraulic fracturing is an abnormally dangerous activity should be dis-
cussed at trial, and thus did not dismiss the claim at summary judg-
ment.110 Courts in Pennsylvania have not yet conclusively determined 
whether to use negligence or strict liability to determine fault for con-
tamination of ground water caused by hydraulic fracturing; however, 
they have adopted sections 519 and 520 of the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts to guide judgments in common law.111 
II. Common Law Liability for Hydraulic Fracturing 
 The pending negligence and strict liability cases against hydraulic 
fracturing companies are examples of technology evolving faster than 
the legislation and regulation.112 Often, in cases such as these, the best 
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strategy for plaintiffs is to rely on common-law remedies instead of stat-
utory law or regulations. 
A. The Allocation of Fault in Common Law 
 There are several ways to allocate fault in common law, two of 
which are negligence and strict liability.113 Negligence “imposes liability 
for harms that are caused by the failure of an actor to exercise ‘due 
care’ or ‘reasonable care.’”114 This standard is usually based on how a 
“reasonably careful person” would behave, but may also involve a cost-
benefit analysis of taking such care.115 In cases where a potential plain-
tiff could prevent damage by simply being careful, negligence is an ap-
propriate cause of action.116 In contrast, strict liability “means that any 
action that causes contamination may give rise to liability.”117 The activ-
ity that led to the contamination would not be prohibited through strict 
liability, but instead the defendant would simply have to pay for any 
damages of the behavior.118 Additionally, plaintiffs do not have to prove 
carelessness under strict liability, which can be especially difficult in en-
vironmental contamination cases.119 Strict liability, however, is limited 
to cases involving “abnormally dangerous activities.”120 In order to fully 
understand strict liability, it is necessary to first be familiar with its his-
torical foundations and its underlying rationale. 
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B. Historical Foundations of Strict Liability 
 The origin of strict liability can be traced to the classic English case 
Rylands v. Fletcher.121 In Rylands, the defendants constructed a reservoir 
on their own land and filled it with water.122 Beneath the plaintiff’s res-
ervoir, however, were abandoned underground mines that began un-
der the neighbors’ property, but eventually intersected with those un-
der the newly-created reservoir.123 As soon as the reservoir was filled, 
the water went through the abandoned mines and into the neighbor’s 
functioning mines, causing their destruction.124 Although the court 
found that the defendants were not negligent in building a reservoir on 
their land, they were still held liable.125 The court held that if a land-
owner brings something onto the land which would not otherwise be 
there, and that thing is dangerous if not properly cared for, the land-
owner is responsible for any damages that result, even if the behavior 
was not deliberate or negligent.126 The decision in Rylands highlighted 
the fact that while certain activities are appropriate at certain locations, 
they are not appropriate everywhere.127 
 Although Rylands established a precedent in England, it was not 
unanimously followed in the United States.128 U.S. courts resisted the 
idea of strict liability partly because it would provide damages to harmed 
plaintiffs, thereby inhibiting the expansion of the western frontier.129 
Therefore, U.S. courts did not follow the Rylands analysis, but instead 
held defendants strictly liable only for injuries sustained by plaintiffs 
from explosives.130 Another reason many courts did not accept the Ry-
lands principle is that they misinterpreted the case to mean that a de-
fendant is “absolutely liable in all cases whenever anything under his 
control escapes and causes harm.”131 In contrast, Professor Prosser un-
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derstood Rylands to mean that “the defendant will be liable when he 
damages another by a thing or activity inappropriate to the place where 
it is maintained, in the light of the character of that place and its sur-
roundings.”132 By the 1930s, almost half of American jurisdictions fol-
lowed either the rule of Rylands or some derivative.133 
C. Rationale for Strict Liability 
 There are different theories as to when courts should use a strict 
liability analysis. For example, Judge Posner believes strict liability exists 
to make plaintiffs whole when negligence cannot—especially when 
causation is difficult to prove.134 Other scholars argue that courts 
should use strict liability more liberally. One commentator suggests that 
there are only two reasons for rejecting strict liability: “(1) high transac-
tion costs in incidents characterized by low losses (e.g., the water leak 
cases); and (2) interactive situations (e.g., highway accidents and con-
tacts with electric power lines).”135 Part of the reason some advocate for 
wider use of strict liability is, in contrast to negligence, it guarantees 
more accountability for accidents.136 
 The strict liability doctrine results in a cost-effective precaution 
because “rational actors who bear the costs of the harms that they cause 
will take all cost-effective measures that are available to economize on 
that liability.”137 Thus, by holding a party strictly liable for harm caused 
by its actions, the party will make efficient market decisions and change 
its actions so as to internalize the cost of the damages incurred by its 
risky activity.138 There are several legal scholars who believe that “strict 
liability is more effective than negligence in deterring socially harmful 
conduct” and therefore should be invoked in most instances of acci-
dental injury.139 
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 Another rationale for liberally applying strict liability is the alloca-
tion of risk principle.140 This principle is based on the concept of fair-
ness; if one party decides to create an abnormal or undue risk of harm 
to members of the community, that party should be held responsible 
for the harm caused.141 Essentially, strict liability incentivizes an actor to 
avoid accidents by denying the actor any excuse.142 It gives the actor an 
incentive to experiment with methods of preventing accidents, such as 
relocating, changing, or reducing the activity causing the accident.143 
Regardless of the rationale for its application, strict liability is undoubt-
edly a very powerful tort doctrine.144 
III. Current Status 
 The Restatement (Second) of Torts incorporates the historical founda-
tions and rationale of strict liability into its definition. The Restatement 
provides that one who “carries on an abnormally dangerous activity” is 
liable for any resulting harm even if the utmost care has been used to 
prevent harm.145 To determine whether an activity is “abnormally dan-
gerous,” six factors are taken into consideration: 
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the 
person, land or chattels of others; (b) likelihood that the 
harm . . . will be great; (c) inability to eliminate the risk by 
the exercise of reasonable care; (d)extent to which the activ-
ity is not a matter of common usage; (e) inappropriateness 
of the activity to the place where it is carried on; and (f) ex-
tent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its 
dangerous attributes.146 
The drafters of the Restatement used these six factors because they did 
not believe it was possible to create a definition inclusive enough to 
cover every potential case.147 The comments which accompany the Re-
statement clarify two important additional points: (1) it does not matter 
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whether the activity is undertaken in pursuit of profit or pleasure,148 
and (2) the doctrine of strict liability is not limited to the defendant’s 
land—the activity could also occur on public land.149 
 All six of the factors are important and need to be considered, but 
strict liability does not require that each factor be present.150 Many 
courts have treated factors (a), (b), and (c) as crucial to the analysis, but 
have inconsistently applied factors (d), (e), and (f).151 The first three 
factors act as a threshold, distinguishing negligence from strict liability, 
by addressing whether reasonable care eliminates the risk of the activity 
in question.152 The last three factors are more fact-based and allow for a 
substantial amount of judicial discretion.153 The essential question is 
whether the dangers caused by the activity and the inappropriateness of 
the location are so great that, despite a contribution to the community, 
the defendant “should be required as a matter of law to pay for any 
harm it causes without the need of a finding of negligence.”154 
A. Differentiating Strict Liability from Negligence 
 The first three factors of the analysis determine whether an act was 
negligent.155 It is imperative to make this determination at the start of 
the analysis because strict liability is inappropriate to determine fault 
when reasonable care can eliminate a substantial amount of risk.156 The 
Restatement is unclear as to whether strict liability can be applied simply 
in the absence of negligence, or whether it must first be demonstrated 
that proving negligence is impossible.157 Historically, courts favored 
negligence over strict liability for land and water contamination cas-
es,158 but courts have recently invoked strict liability more frequently.159 
Some experts even encourage the adoption of strict liability to avoid 
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the complex and expensive litigation necessary to prove damages and 
causation in negligence cases.160 
 According to the Restatement’s factors listed above,161 the existence 
of a high degree of risk of some harm to another (factor a) should be 
balanced against the likelihood that the harm will be great (factor 
b).162 For example, courts have not imposed strict liability on activities 
relating to the transportation of natural gas, such as explosion or leak 
in transmission line cases.163 Yet, many courts have recognized the dan-
gerous qualities of natural gas and consider the installation of natural 
gas lines to be an inherently dangerous activity.164 Despite finding ac-
tivities relating to natural gas to be inherently dangerous, courts often 
do not impose strict liability on the installation and maintenance of 
natural gas pipelines because these activities are highly regulated.165 
Therefore, although the harm could be great (factor a), since the in-
dustry is well-regulated, the likelihood that such an accident will occur 
is low (factor b).166 
 Similarly, courts usually do not impose strict liability for natural gas 
drilling.167 This is not a general rule, however, but instead is a case by 
case determination.168 For example, in Williams v. Amoco Production Co., 
part of the reason why strict liability was not applied was because the 
natural gas that leaked into the irrigation well did not permanently 
damage the fertility of the soil, crops, or livestock.169 Instead, the pres-
ence of natural gas in the water only reduced the amount of water 
available for irrigating the plaintiff’s crops.170 Since the harm in this 
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particular case was minimal, the court determined that the company 
should not be held strictly liable.171 According to the Restatement, a high 
degree of harm must be present to overcome a low probability of in-
jury.172 In contrast, when the damage resulting from contamination 
significantly affects the water supply, courts may hold the defendant 
strictly liable.173 The Supreme Court of Kansas has held defendants 
strictly liable for water contamination resulting from salt water, sewage 
drain-off from cattle pens, and inadequately treated waste from a 
creamery.174 In these cases, the court found that permanent damage to 
one’s clean water supply was so harmful (factor a) that it outweighed its 
low-probability of occurring (factor b).175 
 The “inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable 
care” (factor c) emphasizes the idea that, unlike negligence, fault does 
not have to be proven in strict liability cases.176 In Berry v. Shell Petroleum, 
the court affirmed the defendant’s liability without proving causation 
for water contamination when salt water leaked from an oil well into 
plaintiffs’ well water and rendered it unfit for use.177 The court ex-
plained that it did not matter that the refinery was operated carefully; 
instead, the decisive factor was simply that the harm occurred.178 The 
first three factors are necessary to determine whether an activity is ul-
trahazardous and not simply negligent. If the activity is not negligent 
then the court must consider factors (d), (e), and (f).179 
B. Social Policy Concerns 
 Courts have broad discretion in deciding strict liability cases be-
cause factors (d), (e), and (f) are very fact sensitive and incorporate 
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social policy.180 Factor (d), the “extent to which the activity is not a mat-
ter of common usage,” is a limitation on the doctrine of strict liabil-
ity.181 In Williams v. Amoco Production Co., the court stated that the drill-
ing and operation of natural gas wells in a specific area is a “matter of 
common usage.”182 Factor (d) inherently assumes that a common activ-
ity will be a “well-developed technology with reciprocal risk exchange 
between participants and bystanders.”183 
 Factor (e), whether an activity is inappropriate to a certain location, 
is central to the strict liability test.184 There are certain activities in which 
the likelihood of harm and the degree of risk are different depending 
on the location of the activity.185 In Branch v. Western Petroleum, the court 
affirmed that an oil company should be held strictly liable for ground-
water contamination from formation water that contained oil, gas, and 
high concentrations of salt and other chemicals—all of which make well 
water unusable.186 The court made this decision even though the pro-
duction of formation water is a natural and necessary by-product of 
producing oil and gas.187 It justified strict liability partly because the 
company maintained the formation water containing the harmful 
chemicals adjacent to the plaintiff’s well.188 The proximity to the well 
made it an abnormally dangerous and inappropriate use of the land.189 
While this factor is often a determinative part of the analysis, courts 
should apply it cautiously.190 If a court is too focused on factor (e), the 
strict liability analysis could quickly turn into a negligence analysis based 
on the reasonableness of the activity at that particular location.191 
 Under factor (f), courts also take the location of the activity into 
consideration when evaluating how the activity benefits the commu-
nity.192 Thus, if a community is dependent on the income produced by 
an abnormally dangerous activity, a court may consider that activity rea-
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sonable.193 This element is incorporated into factor (f), which pre-
sumably allows communities to benefit from progressive ideas and tech-
nologies, instead of stifling innovation with strict liability.194 In analyz-
ing this factor, courts will often weigh the value of the activity to the 
community against its dangerous attributes.195 Some critics discount 
the usefulness of this factor because “almost any activity has some value 
for the community.”196 Others question its utility because it allows, and 
maybe even encourages, externalities that are paid for by accident vic-
tims.197 A recent concurring opinion from a Justice on the Supreme 
Court of Texas illustrates this point—in addressing whether trespassing 
claims could be made in hydraulic fracturing cases, the Justice explicitly 
chose the benefits of natural gas over the risk of contaminated water.198 
The opinion concluded that “[a]mid soaring demand and sagging 
supply, Texas common law must accommodate cutting-edge technolo-
gies able to extract untold reserves from unconventional fields.”199 
 Despite this example, there are several cases which hold that cer-
tain activities should be subjected to strict liability notwithstanding the 
benefit to the community. The court in Berry v. Shell Petroleum, for ex-
ample, held that the water supply of the state is of “greater importance 
than the operation of a business at a reduced cost.”200 In Branch v. West 
Petroleum, the court found that an industrial polluter can and should 
assume the entire cost of his activities rather than externalize the cost 
of the pollution, which would make an innocent party pay.201 Many ju-
risdictions have imposed strict liability on specific types of groundwater 
contamination, either by statute or by recognizing the activity that led 
to the contamination as abnormally dangerous.202 Courts regularly im-
pose strict liability defendants strictly liable on the oil and gas industry, 
mining industry, and manufactured gas industry.203 This occurs be-
cause these activities can result in extensive harm to innocent bystand-
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ers.204 In addition, oil and gas companies have exclusive control over 
their activities, whereas the victims are often unable to protect their 
water supply from contamination.205 While courts tolerate externalities 
in some cases, if the harm is significant they generally hold defendants 
strictly liable.206 
IV. Strict Liability Should Apply to Hydraulic Fracturing 
 In determining whether to apply strict liability to hydraulic fractur-
ing, the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania will 
likely consider the specific nature of hydraulic fracturing, the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts, and case law governing oil and gas use.207 Due to 
social policy and political considerations,208 this court will likely not 
apply strict liability to hydraulic fracturing companies. This Note argues 
that case law supports the decision to hold defendants strictly liable and 
courts should do so given environmental and social policy concerns. 
A. Hydraulic Fracturing: The Case for Strict Liability 
 The threshold issue for the court will be to distinguish negligence 
from strict liability by determining whether reasonable care would elim-
inate the risk associated with hydraulic fracturing.209 In addressing this 
question, the court will rely on the first three factors from the Restate-
ment: “(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to [another]; 
(b) likelihood that the harm . . . will be great; [and] (c) inability to 
eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care.”210 
 In the case of hydraulic fracturing, there is not a high likelihood of 
harm occurring (factor a), but this should be outweighed by the very 
high likelihood that if harm occurs it would be great (factor b).211 The 
technology for hydraulic fracturing has been in use since the 1940s and 
there have been more than one million wells drilled in the United 
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States.212 In comparison to the number of wells drilled, the number of 
cases of contaminated drinking water caused by hydraulic fracturing 
(more than one thousand) is relatively small.213 Yet, permanent con-
tamination of drinking water can result in a high degree of personal, 
physical, and emotional harm through exposure to various hazardous 
gases, chemicals, and industrial wastes.214 If the court were to hold 
companies strictly liable for this harm, the decision would be similar to 
Berry v. Shell Petroleum, where the court found defendants strictly liable 
for contaminating plaintiff’s drinking water with salt water.215 
 In addition, an essential element of the strict liability analysis is 
factor (c), whether reasonable care could eliminate the risk.216 Al-
though no study has clearly determined whether reasonable care would 
significantly decrease the risk of contamination in shale hydraulic frac-
turing,217 the process itself is inherently risky and it does not seem pos-
sible that reasonable care could eliminate all risk.218 The process of 
pumping dangerous chemicals into the ground surrenders all control 
over those chemicals. In fact, companies are only able to retrieve fifteen 
to eighty percent of the hydraulic fluid injected, depending on the 
site.219 The hydraulic fluids are transmitted beyond the defendant’s 
control and the plaintiffs are unable to avert any subsequent harm.220 
Where there are passive victims—as is the case in Berish v. Southwestern 
Energy Production Co. and Fiorentino v. Cabot & Gas—many scholars agree 
that strict liability would provide a better remedy than negligence.221 
 Importantly, factor (c) does not determine whether risks of harm 
arising from hydraulic fracturing could be eliminated through the ex-
ercise of “all conceivable precautions.”222 Instead, the standard in the 
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Restatement is that of reasonable precautions and care.223 Many repre-
sentatives of companies involved in hydraulic fracturing argue that the 
process is safe and that there is no need for increased regulation or 
oversight, thus implying that reasonable care is currently exercised.224 
If the industry argument is to be accepted, it supports the decision to 
impose strict liability because the fact that contamination from hydrau-
lic fracturing occurs demonstrates that contamination cannot be pre-
vented by reasonable care.225 This logic is exemplified in Berry, where 
the court concluded that exercising reasonable care did not excuse the 
company from liability, but rather the mere fact that the water was con-
taminated was enough to impose liability.226 Considered together, the 
first three factors of the analysis suggest that strict liability should apply 
instead of negligence.227 Once the cases at issue overcome this thresh-
old question, the court will likely then consider social policy concerns. 
B. The Social Policy Concerns of Allowing Hydraulic Fracturing 
 The second inquiry incorporates the final three factors: (d) extent 
to which the activity is not a matter of common usage; (e) inappropri-
ateness of the activity to the place where it is carried out; and (f) extent 
to which the value of the activity to the community is outweighed by its 
dangerous attributes.228 The court will first analyze where the hydraulic 
fracturing is taking place and whether hydraulic fracturing is a matter 
of common usage at that location.229 Guidance from the Restatement 
suggests that oil drilling is not abnormally dangerous when it takes 
place on “oil lands,” but that it could be abnormally dangerous if it oc-
curs in other areas.230 It is unclear how common the activity must be to 
qualify as a common usage.231 This issue is further complicated by Sus-
quehanna County’s current transition from an agriculturally driven 
economy to one more dependent on natural gas.232 This transition, 
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which started in 2006, undoubtedly affects what is considered a com-
mon usage of the land.233 
 Similarly, there is no clear delineation as to what locations are ap-
propriate for hydraulic fracturing.234 Previous courts have held oil and 
gas well companies strictly liable for wells in thickly settled communi-
ties,235 but not in rural areas.236 Therefore, the Pennsylvania courts will 
need to consider that although Susquehanna County is often referred 
to as a rural area, the definition of rural is open to wide interpreta-
tion.237 For example, it is unclear whether the area where the contami-
nation occurred, in towns as close as thirty minutes away from the city 
of Scranton, is sufficiently rural.238 Furthermore, the court will evaluate 
how close the hydraulic wells were to the plaintiffs’ property and water 
supply.239 In both lawsuits, all of the wells were drilled less than 2000 
feet (0.38 miles), with some as close as 400 feet, from the plaintiffs’ res-
idences and water supplies.240 If building a well 400 feet from a per-
son’s water supply was performed while exercising reasonable care, as 
the defendants claim, then strict liability should clearly apply because 
risk cannot be eliminated at this distance.241 Furthermore, the plaintiffs 
should not be expected to move from their homes and communities to 
avoid the harm.242 
 In addition to being a non-natural use based on the history of that 
region, hydraulic fracturing is a non-natural use because it brings min-
erals from the bed rock to water situated above that level, which would 
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not otherwise occur.243 Similarly, in Berry, the court applied strict liabil-
ity to oil drilling operations near the plaintiff’s residence that brought 
salt water to the surface and contaminated plaintiff’s drinking water.244 
The court concluded that the “salt water had been harmless as long as 
it was left in the ground, but once it was raised to the surface of the 
earth it became a harmful agent.”245 The court went on to say that 
“[t]he right to recover results from the company having the harmful 
substance on its land and permitting it to escape to the damage of 
plaintiff.”246 Like the salt water in Berry, the unnatural minerals 
brought to the water level by fracing introduce a harm that favors the 
application of strict liability under factor (e).247 
ion.252 
                                                                                                                     
 Finally, factor (f)—the extent to which the value of the activity is 
outweighed by its risk to the community—provides the most judicial 
discretion because it is very fact-sensitive.248 In these cases, the court 
has the opportunity to weigh the importance of domestic energy and 
local economic growth against the importance of clean water.249 If hy-
draulic fracturing is sufficiently valuable to Pennsylvania communities, 
the court may not regard it as abnormally dangerous because of the 
value of the activity itself.250 Although many residents have environ-
mental concerns, many are eager to profit by selling the mineral rights 
below their land.251 As a result, communities in Pennsylvania affected 
by hydraulic fracturing are divided as to whether the risks associated 
with hydraulic fracturing are worth the monetary benefits to the com-
munity and to the nat
 Due to the lack of regulation and the difficulty proving causation, 
plaintiffs can likely recover only for the damage caused by hydraulic 
fracturing if the court imposes strict liability.253 Applying strict liability is 
not only necessary to make plaintiffs whole, but it would also demon-
strate the importance of water quality, which is an issue that will only 
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increase in importance in the future.254 Traditionally, water quality cas-
es have been more important in the western, arid states where agricul-
ture is more prevalent.255 Yet hydraulic fracturing water quality cases in 
Pennsylvania should be treated with equal importance because the 
same area that contains natural gas also supplies more than 15 million 
people with water.256 As a result, the threat of contamination from hy-
draulic fracturing should not only concern current plaintiffs, but any 
other party interested in Pennsylvania’s future water quality.257 
 Imposing strict liability would not end hydraulic fracturing in 
Pennsylvania.258 Instead, it would mean that the defendants in these 
cases would be free to continue to lease land and to drill on that land, 
but they would be held responsible for the externalities caused by frac-
ing, such as contamination.259 Therefore, the defendants would have a 
significant incentive to limit accidents, and might even explore alterna-
tive drilling areas or other best practices.260 By imposing a cost for acci-
dents, strict liability would be a compromise between those who want to 
drill and explore natural gas deposits and those who want to limit natu-
ral gas exploration.261 
Conclusion 
 As soon as the first natural gas well was drilled in Susquehanna 
County in 2006, a political and legal battle emerged with both sides 
fighting for conflicting environmental principles.262 While some envi-
ronmentalists support natural gas drilling because it burns cleaner than 
coal, other environmentalists are shocked and dismayed at the threat of 
water contamination.263 The potential for severe environmental dam-
age is compounded by both the speed in which the industry has devel-
oped in Pennsylvania and the lack of comprehensive federal and state 
regulation.264 
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 Currently, the best method for plaintiffs to acquire a remedy for 
their harms is at common law, specifically through the application of a 
strict liability cause of action.265 The courts’ conclusions will likely be 
determined by whether, in their cost-benefit analysis, the attributes of 
natural gas outweigh its destructive effects.266 The court should impose 
strict liability because it would be a balance between both sides—it 
would compensate current and future plaintiffs for harm endured, but 
also allow hydraulic fracturing to continue.267 
 Natural gas exploration and drilling will not necessarily contami-
nate the nation’s water supply.268 But, strict liability would serve as a 
strong incentive to limit future contamination.269 As the nation contin-
ues to seek solutions to improve its energy options and retain a clean 
water supply, water quality issues and energy production issues will clash 
with greater frequency.270 The decision currently facing the court is an 
opportunity to create a strong precedent for addressing these issues. 
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